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Reviews
The Law of Contract. By G. H. L. Fridman. Toronto: Carswell,
1976. Pp. Iv., 676. Price: $60.00
The Law of Contracts. By S. M. Waddams. Toronto: Canada Law
Book, 1977. Pp. cxviii, 498. Price: $37.50.
There can be no denying the need for good Canadian legal
textbooks. While recent years have seen more home-grown texts on
the market there are many important areas left unserved. In the past
year two Canadian text books on contract law have been published.
One way of assessing these two books is to ask wehter they are
suitable replacements for English contract texts which we have had
to resort to for the want of anything Canadian. The heavy use of,
and constant reference to, Canadian sources, both legislative and
judicial, is, of course, a valuable asset. Needless to say, a textbook
must be more than just a reference source; it must also offer a clear,
accurate, readable and perceptive discussion of the law and the
economic, social and political context within which it operates. This
is especially so in the contentious areas of the subject covered.
It is inadequate for a textbook to be too general or too elementary.
Similarly it will be insufficient if it adds nothing in terms of insight
and explanation. If the book is little more than a gazetteer it will be
of limited use. Canadian texts, therefore, must attack their subjects
in a different, more effective and more imaginative way than their
already available English counterparts. The same time-worn
discussion of legal principles and rules is unlikely to be of much use
just because most or many of the references are to Canadian
sources. Replacing one set of details for another will not illuminate
an otherwise cloudy area of the law.
The books by Professors Fridman and Waddams must be looked
at in the light of these considerations. By any guidelines the book by
Professor Waddams must be seen as the better, more useful one. It
is clearly written and is interestingly organized. The introduction is
informative and ably sets the scene, for a discussion of the law of
contract in a modem context emphasising, as it does, the clear
tendency of courts to move away from contract law's nineteenth
century roots and economic heritage towards a greater recognition
of reality. This tendency is well illustrated in the long chapter on
unconscionability.
The Law of Contract 399
Although there are now a number of good books on the history of
contract law it is unfortunate that neither Waddams nor Fridman
saw fit to include much more than a few hints of the historical
development of the law of contract in Canada. As teachers of
contracts to first year law students are aware, difficulties with
concepts can frequently be clarified by some discussion of historical
origins. Many of the notions and institutions of our law are
incomprehensible without some historical background. Both books
would have been better with an historical introduction.
Part II of Waddams' book deals with enforceability and is divided
into chapters on Bargains and Non-bargains, with chapters also on
Intention, Unilateral Contracts and The Statute of Frauds. The
former distinction - that drawn between rules applicable to
bargains and non-bargains - is a refreshing one for a text book and
to my mind works well. Part III deals with Contracts and Third
Parties and contains chapters on Agency, Assignment, Third Party
Beneficiaries and Mistake and Third Parties. Part IV has chapters on
Mistake, Misrepresentations, Unconscionability, Public Policy and
Non-Performance and Breach. Capacity is dealt with in Part V and
Remedies in Part VI.
This organization has led to some idiosyncrasies but none of any
seriousness. In fact they are only odd when compared to
traditionally organized textbooks. For instance, consideration is
dealt with in three places - in the chapters on bargains,
non-bargains and unconscionability. This is perfectly acceptable,
indeed preferable, when ohe considers that the relevance of the
doctrine is different in these three contexts. Perhaps Waddams is to
be congratulated for pointing the way to the differences and
encouraging us to look at an institution such as consideration in
context and not in isolation as if with a life of its own. Also,
perhaps, the less we talk about consideration, or at least the more
skeptical we are about it, the more likely it is that it will be relegated
to its proper, rather insignificant, function in the law of contracts. If
it: was ever needed, Atiyah's paper, Consideration in Contracts: A
Fundamental Restatement shows the present worth of this so-called
doctrine. 1
The grouping of subject matter under the heading of uncon-
scionability is also a valuable contribution to reorganizing our
1. P. Atiyah, Consideration in Contracts: A Fundamental Restatement (Canberra:
Australian National University Press, 1971)
400 The Dalhousie Law Journal
thoughts on the law of contracts. Public policy, of which
unconscionability is merely a reflection, now plays such an
overwhelmingly important role in the law of contracts that it must
be recognized for what it is. Gone are the days when certainty had
the upper hand. The courts are now much more concerned with
fairness and equity, and with making decisions based upon their
perception of what is in the public interest.
Fridman, in his book, adopts a traditional organization. Part II -
Formation of Contract - contains chapters on Intention, Elements
of Consent (offer and acceptance), Factors Vitiating Reality of
Consent (mistake, misrepresentation and duress and undue
influence), Capacity, Consideration and Writing. Part III - The
Contents of The Contract - has chapters on Express and Implied
Terms and Particular Types of Terms - conditions, warranties
fundamental terms and privative (exclusion and limitation of
liability) clauses. Part IV, entitled Essential Validity - covers
illegality, while Part V is a section on privity of contract and
assignment - there is no chapter on agency. Performance,
discharge by agreement, breach, impossibility and frustration by
operation of law are dealt with in Part VI and Part VII is the
remedies section.
So much for the organization of the books - now what of their
content. Waddams' is the better book because it is firstly more
readable, secondly less general in the level of its discussion and
thirdly more intensive - the difficult areas (and there are many in
the law of contracts) are dealt with in a probing, investigative
manner. There is a clear attempt to give the reader the flavour of
conflicting views and possibilities in contentious areas, and to direct
the reader to decisions in the United States and other common law
jurisdictions. Also, there is valuable discussion on the many statutes
affecting contractual rules and principles. Within the limited
confines of a textbook Professor Waddams provides a stimulating
account of the law of contract.
Professor Fridman's book is almost half as long again as
Waddams'. Much of this extra space is taken up in the discussion of
a great number of Canadian cases in some detail. In fact in many
parts of the book the analysis is of cases, often rather insignificant
ones, rather than of principles. While some of the cases are worthy
of individual attention one gets the feeling that Fridman has
discussed many of them just because they are Canadian authorities.
This, it is submitted, is not a sufficient reason. Canada has not
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produced a strong jurisprudence in contract law - few cases need
to be singled out for special consideration. Fridman's treatment very
often avoids contentious issues - perhaps for the reason that there
is too much attention to detail and too little to underlying principles,
notions, ideas and trends. In comparison Waddams' approach is far
more sophisticated and satisfactory.
Fridman's discussion is not only frequently long but it generally
fails to come to grips with the real, underlying issues. A good
example of this is the treatment of exemption clauses - the
inconsistencies and difficulties in the case law are not brought out
and there is little or no discussion of statutory interventions in this
area. His comments are often inconcise and the cases are discussed
one by one rather than as part of a whole scheme.
A further problem with Fridman's book is the rather large number
of errors. Some are of a rather simple nature such as mistaking the
facts of a case or of what the case is, or can be, authority for. Other
errors are more substantial. Some statements can be questioned on
the ground that they do not represent what the authorities have in
fact stated. For instance, Fridman talks in terms of a promise being
required to act to his detriment if he is to be able to benefit from the
defence of promissory estoppel. This would almost invariably
provide consideration to support the changed promise and, as Lord
Denning M.R. has indicated on a number of occasions, for instance
in Alan v. El Nasr Export and Import Co., 2 it is surely only required
for the promisee to act and not necessary for him to act to his
detriment. This point and case is not even footnoted in Fridman's
book.
There are several other examples but perhaps it sufficies to
mention that the account of what Suisse Atlantique3 decided with
regard to the doctrine of fundamental breach is most misleading.
Perhaps in subsequent editions the difficulties and errors will be
ironed out. With more concentration on fundamental and
contentious issues and less case by case analysis, Fridman's book
would be a better one.
While I would have little hesitation in not recommending
Fridman's book as a suitable replacement for an established English
text, it nevertheless contains much of value to Canadian common
lawyers whether in practice or academia. Waddams' book is one
2. (1972), 2 All E. R. 127
3. [1967]1 A.C. 361
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which I would recommend to both students and teachers and
practitioners alike, for it is clear, concise and stimulating, and is a





Towards a New Canada. By the Committee on the Constitution, the
Canadian Bar Association. Ottawa: Can. Bar Assoc., 1978. Pp.
xvi, 159 plus French translation. Price: $10.00
Controversy over the Committee's recommendation that the Queen
be replaced as Head of State by a Canadian (which recommendation
was leaked to the press while the Queen was visiting Canada) has
led to the other suggestions contained in this Report not receiving
the consideration which, in this writer's opinion, they deserve.
The federal government has committed itself to reforming by July
1, 1979, aspects of the Canadian Constitution lying within federal
jurisdiction. A Constitutional Amendment Bill introduced in
Parliament in June, 1978 contained proposals for entrenchment of a
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, reform of the Senate
and Supreme Court and adoption of amending mechanisms. The
subsequent Federal-Provincial Conference on the Constitution at the
end of October, 1978, revealed that provincial governments object
to these significant changes being implemented without their
consent. The provinces also made it clear that their consent would
only be forthcoming if the federal government agrees, at the same
time, to a redistribution of legislative authority between Ottawa and
the provinces. Questions have been raised about the constitutional-
ity of the federal Parliament proceeding unilaterally to make these
changes and the Prime Minister has agreed to submit the issue of
Parliament's authority to reform the Senate to the Supreme Court on
a constitutional reference.
Publication in August of the Committee's Report, at the Canadian
Bar Association's Annual Meeting, was, therefore, timely.
Commissioned by the Association at its 1977 Annual Meeting, the
Report was prepared by twelve members (representing all ten
provinces) with Dr. Gerard V. LaForest as Director of Research. It
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fulfilled, in an admirable fashion, its mandate to define "the
essential constitutional attributes of a Canadian federalism" and set
forth ". . . proposals for a workable federalism . . . namely one
that would meet present-day needs, one that would promote
harmony and a strong sense of Canadian identity among all
Canadians, and one that would 'guarantee the preservation of the
historical rights of our two founding cultures'." (p.xvi)
After a preliminary discussion of the need for constitutional
reform and how this should proceed, the Report discusses the
objectives of a constitution, setting out what the Committee sees as
the "basic values sought to be fostered by Canadians through
government" (p.10). It argues for an entrenchment of certain
political, legal economic, egalitarian, and language rights and
freedoms and an express commitment to the alleviation of regional
disparities. Proposals are made for preserving a system of
responsible, parliamentary, government, for provincial appointment
of Lieutenant-Governors (or "Chief Executive Officers"), for
abolishing the federal power of disallowance, and for reforming the
Senate. Recommendations for the judicial system include: enshrin-
ing the principle of the independence of the judiciary; guaranteeing
a right to judicial review; and maintaining a single judicial system as
apposed to a dual system of federal and provincial courts. Consent
of a Judiciary Committee of the reformed Senate (Upper House),
working in camera, would be necessary for appointment of Judges
to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Committee recommends
against creation of a specialized constitutional court or a separate
civil law chamber of the Supreme Court.
More than one-half of the Report consists of a discussion of the
division of powers between federal and provincial legislatures.
Although stressing that serious harm to the Canadian nation could
flow from "any massive shift of power" (p. 3) from federal to
provincial authorities, proposals are made (concerning fiscal
matters, economic powers, transportation and communications,
international relations, matrimonial matters, and residuary and
emergency powers) designed to strengthen provincial control over
cultural matters and local affairs (including the management of the
provincial economy) while preserving sufficient federal power to
manage the national economy, deal with the defence of the country,
and generally function as a national government. The Report ends
with a proposal for an amending formula - basically the Victoria
formula modified to require consent by at least two of the western
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provinces including one of the two most populous but not requiring
combined populations of at least fifty per cent of the population of
all the western provinces.
The Report follows a format designed for easy reading.
Recommendations are set out in summary fashion at the beginning
of each chapter. These are then fully explained in the accompanying
text, policy considerations being clearly articulated in a precise yet
penetrating analysis. The complete set of recommendations are then
collected together in eleven pages at the end of the Report.
The Report is worth reading if for no other reason than to see how
well, in the articulation of policy considerations for each issue,
competing values are identified and weighed in the Committee's
search for a balanced federalism consisting of strong provinces as
well as a strong central government. For example, in discussing
jurisdiction over telecommunications, (pp. 119-20) the Report
clearly identifies the conflict between the provincial interest in
"local concerns", such as preservation of language and culture, and
the national interest in maintaining a strong unified broadcasting
system to promote a national awareness and sense of unity while
avoiding possible manipulation of the media for partisan political
purposes. Another issue on which the Committee provides good
insight into the competing values at stake is the question of
jurisdiction over resources and resource revenue. Readers may
disagree, however, with the balance ultimately struck between
values in this area. Let us consider the Committee's comments.
Recommendations in the Report concerning resources are
generally well thought out. The Supreme Court's decision in the
Potash Case' was still to be delivered. The Committee's discussion
of the relationship between provincial ownership of resources and
federal competence over trade and commerce (pp. 108-09) clearly
anticipates the weaknesses in that decision. Control over the rate of
development of resources is essential for proper provincial
management of local economic activity and social development.
Granted, the federal Parliament must have certain power to regulate
interprovincial and international commerce. In the absence of an
emergency, however, this should not mean that the federal
Parliament can compel the export of a greater quantity of mineral
resources than a province is willing to have exported. A province's
1. Central Canada Potash Co. Limited et al v. The Government of Saskatchewan
et al. (1978), as yet unreported.
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control over development of its economy could then be completely
frustrated by federal approval of the accelerated exploitation of that
province's resources, in return, for example, for tariff concessions
of benefit mainly to another province. Control over the rate of
development is a very important mechanism for the province in
ensuring optimal local enjoyment of spin-off benefits. 2 A provincial
government may want time to train its labour force so that it can
participate fully in the resource extraction process. A province may
want to give local industry time to develop so as to obtain contracts
from the resource developer. In the less-developed provinces, it is
difficult to see how provincial governments will ever be able to
create industrial bases except through resource development. If the
Potash Decision stands, these provinces appear doomed to
perpetual dependence upon federal aid. The Committee's recom-
mendations recognize this problem and assert the need for
provincial control over the rate of development.
The Report does not do as good a job in reconciling the federal
taxing power with provincial ownership of resources. It recom-
mends that provincial legislatures should have authority to levy
indirect taxes, thereby removing one of the obstacles imposed by
the CIGOL Case3 and similar decisions, on efficient provincial
extraction of economic rent from mineral resource development.
The Committee, however, accepts that the provinces should not be
permitted to impose taxes that will ultimately be passed on to
consumers outside the province (pp. 70-72). Considering the large
proportion of provincial mineral resources going into the export
market, it is submitted that this broad restriction will severely
impede provincial attempts to develop rational and efficient
methods for deriving revenue from the sale of their depleting
resources. Perhaps the risk of creating "tariff barriers" is
outweighed by the potential benefit from improved resource
management. At the very least, this should be an area of concurrent
jurisdiction so that provincial taxes could be valid until overridden
by specific federal export legislation.
The Committee's rejection of anything which can be construed as
a "tariff barrier" stems from its belief that there must be free
circulation throughout the country of all economic resources,
2. See, generally, Crommelin, "Offshore Oil and Gas Rights: A Comparative
Study" (1974), 14 Nat. Res. J. 457 at esp. 484-85
3. Canadian Industrial Gas & Oil Ltd. v. The Government of Saskatchewan et al.
and The Attorney General of Canada et al. (1977), 18 N.R. 107 (S.C.C.)
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commodities, services, labour and capital, so that the whole country
can "benefit from the specialization resulting from the comparative
regional advantages of productivity" (p. 101). It seems, however,
that carried to its logical conclusion, reliance upon this principle
would nullify any meaningful attempts to alleviate regional
economic disparities. Why shouldn't there be constitutional
recognition of the legitimacy of some forms of economic
"affirmative action" where regional disparities exist? Primary
resource development, as a mechanism for creating an industrial
base within a province, is probably of greater importance to the
poorer provinces. Why wouldn't it be feasible for a new consitituion
to recognize some exceptions to the rule against tariff barriers where
this might legitimize provincial policies (such as preference for
local goods and services) which could lead to reduced regional
economic disparities? Economists can probably present formidable
obstacles to this approach. But the Committee's analysis does not
adequately explain how its preference for "free trade" might be
reconciled with its recommendation that "the alleviation of regional
economic disparities should be a fundamental purpose of the
Constitution" (p.27).
The Committee shows some inconsistency in its recommenda-
tions concerning offshore mineral resources and fisheries (pp.
107-110). Although placing more emphasis on international
implications than I believe these deserve, 4 the Committee concludes
that these should be outweighed by the way the development of
offshore resources will so closely relate to the local economy.
Pointing out that people living by the sea regard it as a source of
livelihood rather than a barrier, the Report recommends provincial
regulatory control of offshore resources out to the edge of the
continental shelf. International matters may be dealt with, just as for
onshore resources, by Parliament's competence over defence,
customs, international boundaries, and so forth. Why then does the
Committee recommend that the federal Parliament have exclusive
legislative control over seacoast fisheries? The development of the
4. The Committee appeared to justify the Supreme Court's decision in the
Reference re Ownership of Off-Shore Mineral Rights (of British Columbia), [1967]
S.C.R. 792, on the basis of international implications similar to these in the United
States and Australian Offshore Resources cases. But in both these countries there
exists an external affairs power in the federal government which permits the
overriding of state interests. This has not been the law in Canada (Labour
Conventions Case, [1951] S.C.R. 31) and indeed the Committee recommends it
not become the law (pp. 125-28).
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fishing industry will have a tremendous impact upon the economy,
culture, and social development of the adjacent province. For
example, encouragement of offshore fleets to the detriment of
inshore fishing will result in many communities in Atlantic Canada
becoming unviable. It is submitted that as strong an argument can
be made for provincial control of fisheries as for other offshore
resources. International implications arising from the migratory
nature of some species of fish do not seem to be so important as to
outweigh the potential impact of fisheries management upon the
social, economic and cultural life of the adjacent provinces - a
matter which should be dealt with locally. The federal Parliament
could still deal with the international aspects of the fisheries but
complete federal control over the resource is not necessary.
One serious gap in the Report, all the more glaring because of the
Committee's express recognition of the policy considerations
underlying every constitutional issue, is the failure of the Report to
deal with the inadequacy of the judiciary's current approach to
constitutional decision-making. Stemming from the judiciary's
reluctance to admit it engages in value-judgments, its approach to
constitutional interpretation can be described as a conclusory or
question-begging one, involving the placing of labels upon
activities and legislation. 5 So in the CIGOL Case6 we see Mr.
Justice Martland for the majority label the Saskatchewan tax an
"indirect tax" and "directly aimed" at oil exports, matters beyond
provincial jurisdiction, because the tax would be passed on to the
consumer. In fact, the tax had no impact upon the price to the
consumer. That price was the world price for oil, as determined
mainly by the price set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries. The question in the CIGOL Case was: who would be
permitted to recover the increased economic rent generated by a rise
in the international price of oil, the Saskatchewan government or the
oil companies? No analysis was made by the majority of the impact
their decision would have upon the federal-provincial balance of
power within the Canadian federation. Again, in the Potash Case, 7
the Saskatchewan legislation regulating production was charac-
terized as relating to "exports", and therefore beyond provincial
5. See, Weiler, In the Last Resort (Toronto: Carswell, 1974) at 51-53, 115-119,
155-185; and Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1977) at
80-81
6. Supra, note 3
7. Supra, note 1
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jurisdiction, because it dealt with a product which was being
exported. No attempt was made to reconcile this decision with
provincial ownership of resources. No attempt was made to explain
the result in terms of the proper balance of power between the
provinces and the federal Parliament.
Some would argue that a loss of public confidence would occur if
the "neutral" image of the court were destroyed by revealing to the
general public that judges are not mere mechanical appliers of the
law but in fact make policy choices or value-judgments in just about
every case before them. This writer submits that there is a greater
danger of loss of judicial authority should decisions continue to be
as artificial and question-begging as they often are today. The
labelling approach to judicial reasoning encourages arbitrariness
and creates uncertainty. Decisions become sterile exercises in
logical derivation having little contact with reality. Opportunities
are lost for injecting new life into the law by reference to other
disciplines. 8 The Canadian Bar Association Committee should have
dealt with this problem since the value of a new constitution will be
seriously reduced if judicial interpretation is going to quickly distort
its meaning in any event. Perhaps the solution would be to add a
section to the new constitution along the following lines:
While affirming the principle of parliamentary supremacy under
this constitution and the system of responsible parliamentary
government preserved herein, it is recognized that the inevitable
ambiguity of language will force courts to make choices between
competing values in attempting to apply the laws laid down by
Parliament; accordingly it is declared that judges in interpreting
this constitution, and any statutes of federal or provincial
legislatures, shall, by reference to the statement of the aims and
essential attributes of the Canadian federation earlier set out, and
to the probable effect of their decision, fully and clearly articulate
the policy considerations underlying their decisions.
There is no way that constitutional amendment can guarantee
against poor judicial reasoning but perhaps an approach can be
encouraged which will lessen the frequency of sterile, artificial,
reliance upon what the layman ever increasingly describes
scornfully as "legal technicalities".
8. See generally, McDougal, Lasswell and Miller, The Interpretation of
Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure (New
Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1967); Lyon, "A Fresh Approach to Constitutional
Law" (1967), 45 Can. Bar Rev. 554
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There are other defects in the Report. Its treatment of Native
Rights is extremely weak. The two paragraphs dealing with this
issue recommend that native people enjoy equality of rights with all
Canadians and urge that we "scrupulously abide by our agreements
with the native peoples and recognize their claims as they are
established" (p. 11). That discussion, framed in what native leaders
would refer to as "assimilationist sentiments,9 ignores the native
peoples' claim for special status which they say flows from their
aboriginal rights. Today the claims of Indians, Metis and Innuit,
usually include claims for greater political control over their
affairs. 10 They condemn many existing treaties as having been
obtained by fraud or undue influence from people with little or no
bargaining power. I In areas not covered by treaties they claim that
aboriginal rights have been interfered with illegally and without
compensation. 12 They say correction of these injustices can be
brought about, not by monetary payments but only by the provision
of territory within which they will have the ability to preserve their
distinctive identity and life-style.1 3 In the Calder Case 14 three
judges of the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that aboriginal
rights may exist and be worthy of protection by the Court even
though not flowing from a statute, treaty or Royal Proclamation.
Any new constitution which does not recognize that aboriginal
rights exist as legal rights, enforceable in the courts, even in the
absence of treaties, will not have the respect of our native
population and will have failed to recognize what the Canadian Bar
Report refers to as "the claims of simple justice" (p. 11).
The Committee's recommendations for Senate reform raise
serious doubts about the course which present constitutional
discussions are taking. Negotiations are proceeding between the
9. Brief presented by Harry W. Daniels, President of the Native Council of
Canada, to the First Ministers' Conference on the Constitution, Oct. 30 to Nov. 1,
1978, at p. I
10. See the Metis and the Indian Brotherhood respective proposals to the Federal
Government (1978), 1 Canadian Native Law Bulletin, No. 2, at 20-29
11. Ren6 Fumoleau, As Long as this Land Shall Last: A History of Treaty 8 and
Treaty 11, 1870-1939 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974)
12. For example, the submission made by the Naskopi Montagnais Innu
Association of Labrador on Sept. 15, 1978, to the Premier of Newfoundland.
13. Geoffrey S. Lester, "Primitivism Versus Civilization: A Basic Question in the
Law of Aboriginal Rights to Land" in the Labrador Innuit Association Land Use
and Occupancy Study, Our Footprints are Everywhere (1977), Appendix One, at
353.
14. (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.)
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provinces and federal government on changes to the existing
division of powers. But these negotiations are proceeding with little
consideration being given to reform of the Upper House. Debate on
the Senate is in limbo awaiting the reference to the Supreme Court
of Canada, which the Prime Minister has promised, to determine if
the Federal Parliament can unilaterally carry out Senate reform.
Provinces seem hesitant to suggest limitations on federal power
through the mechanism of the Senate, apparently because this is
regarded as inconsistent with responsible government. But the
Report shows that a reformed Upper House (with provincially
appointed members) could be a very useful device for providing
greater regional input without dangerously decentralizing the
country. The Report recommends placing limitations upon the
federal emergency, declaratory and spending powers, for example,
by requiring certain Upper House approval. Without a reformed
Senate in the picture a very different division of powers would
probably result from any process of constitutional review. There is
no reason why various methods of Senate reform should not be
considered even if jurisdiction to reform is not yet settled. There
would be no more inconsistency with responsible government than
there is now with present constitutional limitations upon the power
of the elected House of Commons. To arrive at the best possible
constitution for Canada all aspects of reform, including new roles
for the Senate, should be considered contemporaneously with
possible new divisions of authority. Otherwise, useful techniques
for arriving at a properly balanced federalism will be ignored.
The Committee was aware that in dealing with the Monarchy it
was "embarking upon a highly charged emotional issue" (p.34).
To its credit it recognized that to ignore the issue would be to fail in
discharging its mandate of searching for "the essential constitu-
tional attributes of a Canadian federalism". Quoting the findings of
the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the
Constitution to support its position, the Committee concluded that
the Head of State should be a Canadian in order for the office to
fulfill its role as "a major symbol of national identity" (p. 34).
Reaction to this recommendation by Association members consisted
mainly of rising to reaffirm oaths of allegiance previously taken in
capacities ranging from Barrister to Officer in the Queen's Own
Rifles. Perhaps it was rebellious Celtic ancestry which led this
writer to conclude that most speakers were asserting not so much
loyalty to the Monarchy as a desire for continued Anglophone
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supremacy within Canada. 15 Whether or not this assessment was
correct, little consideration was given to the crucial question: will
Quebeckers view retention of the Monarchy as evidence that the
proposed new governmental structure will be Anglophone domi-
nated?
If the answer to the above question is affirmative (as presumably
polls could show), the next question we should be asking ourselves
is whether retention of the Monarchy will significantly increase the
likelihood of the Parti Quebegois winning the proposed referendum
on separation (also known as "sovereignty - association"). If this
question must also be answered affirmatively, then we should be
asking whether our loyalty to the Queen should prevail over our
loyalty to our country? Are we willing to sacrifice the symbol of the
Monarchy if to do this would be a significant factor in preserving a
united Canada?
Unfortunately the courage shown by their Committee in dealing
directly with the issue was not reflected in the comments of the
majority of members at the Canadian Bar Association annual
meeting. The only official position yet taken by the Association has
been to refer the Report to Provincial Branches "for study". The
issue does not appear to be one likely to go away. We can only wait
to see whether the Association at its next annual meeting will be
prepared to fully discharge the responsibility it undertook when the
Committee was formed - to make a contribution to the
constitutional debate so that the decision about Canada's future may
be an informed one. Setting up the Committee was commendable
but only a first step. The Association should now take a position
upon the Committee's recommendations. If fear about the volatility
of the Monarchy issue causes the Association to bury the Committee
Report, many valuable insights which full debate upon the Report




15. An attitude apparently detected elsewhere from time to time by Prof. J. A.
Corry - see, Corry, "The Uses of a Constitution, [1978] Special Lectures of the
Law Society of Upper Canada 1
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Power on Divorce and Other Matrimonial Causes. Edited by
Christine Davies, 3rd. ed. Toronto: Carswell, 1976. Pp. lx, 359.
Price: $40.00
The second edition of Power edited by Professor Julien Payne
antedated the federal Divorce Act. It was very much an
indispensable practitioner's tool and ran to nearly 1,200 pages
including its index. In preparing the third edition, Professor
Christine Davies decided to deal with the federal divorce law in a
volume of 350 or so pages, with Volume Two, relating to
matrimonial causes other than divorce, due out in 1979. Matters
such as nullity, alimony, judicial separation, restitution and custody
under provincial law should present no particular problems;
however, as each province introduces new legislation in the field of
maintenance and matrimonial property, it will become more and
more difficult for the author to find a common thread running
through the legislation to discuss if she attempts to include these
matters in Volume Two. The advent of the provincial law
commissions has created reforms valuable in themselves, but at a
cost of uniformity as between one province and another. It may well
be that the answer to the needs of practitioners for a book on
maintenance and matrimonial property is a series of loose leaf books
in which local contributors set out the position in their particular
province.
With all its manifest faults there is no doubt that passage of the
federal Divorce Act after 100 years of federation effected a great
simplification in the law to the great advantage of clients. Australian
federal legislation conferred similar benefits. It is all the more
disquieting that there have been recent proposals by the Canadian
Bar Association Committee on the Constitution to transfer the
divorce jurisdiction back to the provinces. There is no doubt that
whatever attempts are made to retain a measure of uniformity, e.g.,
by introduction of a common jurisdictional connecting factor, e.g.
domicil, or a full faith and credit clause in the field of recognition,
are doomed to failure. Forum shopping and limping marriages seem
to be the order of the day for clients, and enrolments in conflicts of
laws courses at universities will surely rise. Many family lawyers
(who are otherwise states-rights men) feel that the problem of the
current division of responsibility in family law between federal and
provincial jurisdictions, particularly in the field of matrimonial
property, would be better served by treating matrimonial property
Power on Divorce and Other Matrimonal Causes 413
division on breakdown of marriage as corollary to divorce and
within federal authority. At the moment the diversity of solutions in
the provinces to the problems of matrimonial property seems
scarcely conducive to the public weal. The division of powers
between federally and provincially appointed judges would seem
better served by a series of cross appointments along the lines of the
Hamilton Wentworth Unified Family Court.
The content of the book seems to be a happy blend of academic
and practical matters. The treatment of custody and access provides
an example of the former (p. 228 et seq.) and that of evidence of
adultery of the latter (p. 13 et seq.). If there is a matter of regret, it is
that Professor Davies did not amplify her treatment of the
constitutional problems of the relationship between a Divorce Act
custody order and the provincial parens patriae power as she did in
a subsequent article,' or the problems of the interrelationship
between access orders made under the Divorce Act and subsequent
adoption orders made under provincial law purporting to extinguish
access. 2 In the discussion of the constitutional problems of granting
a wife a lump sum payment secured on the matrimonial home with
the proviso that the husband may satisfy his obligation by
transferring the home to the wife, it is perhaps regrettable that more
was not made about the constitutionality of these orders. In
Connelly v. Connelly, MacKeigan C.J.N.S. described these orders
as seeming to be devices to ensure the equitable distribution of
matrimonial assets. 3 Surely somebody will act on this revealing
statement and appeal one of these orders to the Supreme Court of
Canada, provided that the matter is not overtaken by a federal
abdication of responsibility in this field.
Were it not for the high cost of this book - $40 for a book of 350
pages - it might well command substantial sales as a core text for a
student family law course which could be supplemented by other
materials dealing with matters of provincial family law. However,
the approach followed in the case of Waters on Trusts, which has
been published in a soft edition attractively priced for students, does




I. C. Davies, Interprovincial Custody (1978), LVI Can. Bar Rev. 17.
2. Northv.North, [1978]3A.C.W.S. 19; cf. Re Carter (1976), 15 N.S.R. (2d) 181
3. (1975), 16R.F.L. 171 at 177
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Every Child's Birthright: In Defense of Mothering by Selma
Fraiberg. New York: Basic Books Inc., 1977. Pp. 162. Available
through Fitzhenry and Whitside, Pickering, Ontario at $11.65.
The United Nations has designated 1979 as the International Year of
the Child. In June, 1978, a conference was held in Halifax with the
title "International Year of the Child Workshop". It drew over 200
persons from all walks of life from throughout the Province of Nova
Scotia, including numbers of young people. Its prime objective was
to hear the community's concerns with the role and status of
children and to hear from children themselves in this regard. Two
universally held concerns which came out of the Workshop were,
first, that there is a drastic need to teach "parenting" to parents and
to students in our schools and, secondly, a need to take a critical
look at our educational system and in particular to re-define
parent/teacher and teacher/student relationships.
Selma Fraiberg is Professor of Child Psychoanalysis in the
Department of Psychiatry of the University of Michigan and is the
Director of its Child Development Project. The title of her little
book might be misleading to the casual browser. It is not another
epistle from the anti-abortion league. This reviewer would like to
regard it as an important fact book on "parenting", although Ms.
Fraiberg, in the process, takes uninhibited shots at the legal
system's conduct of custody litigation, day care and social
assistance programmes operating in the United States.
The author's thesis is simply stated in the first chapter:
This book is intended for all those radicals, like myself, who
think that our survival as a human community may depend as
much upon our nurture of love in infancy and childhood as upon
the protection of our society from external threats. (p. 5)
And in particular:
• . . we have learned that the human qualities of enduring love
and commitment to love are forged during the first two years of
life. On this point there is a consensus among scientists from a
wide range of disciplines. (p. 4)
What, then, does the author see as the essential qualitative element
which is necessary during the first two years of life? The answer is
the need for "mothering" so that a personal human bond may be
forged between baby and mother. Indeed, since bottle feeding has
become very common, she says that the nurturing experience has
become much more dependent on the personality of the mother and
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on whether surrounding circumstances promote intimacy between
mother and child. In essence, studies show that unless there is one
or more persons who remain central and stable in this early
experience of the baby, then the child will be left to the realm of
what the author calls "the diseases of non-attachment", the
fundamental characteristic of which is the later incapacity of the
person to form human bonds. A conscience fails to form,
self-observation and self-criticism are lacking as is humour in the
personality. Such diseases of the ego result in impulsive,
uncontrolled behaviour, a low tolerance level, a tendency to be
"distant" and an attitude of total indifference. This condition,
further, requires the persons affected to affirm their existence by
seeking strong psychic jolts. Such jolts come from drugs or the
performance of indiscriminate acts of violence.
What are the backgrounds of such persons? The author is driven
to say:
Often the early childhood histories told a dreary story of lost and
broken connections. A child would be farmed out to relatives, or
foster parents, or institutions: the blurred outlines of one family
faded into those of another, as the child, already anonymous,
shifted beds and families in monotonous succession. (p. 49)
and again
A mother who is severely depressed, or psychotic, or an addict,
is also, for all practical purposes, a mother who is absent from
her baby. A baby who is stored like a package with neighbours
and relatives while his mother works may come to know as many
indifferent caretakers as a baby in the lowest-grade institution
and, at the age of one or two years, can resemble in all significant
ways the emotionally deprived babies of such an institution. (p.
54)
These conclusions are not new. Numerous studies, over the last
thirty years have pointed out these needs.' If the results of not
having such a figure are as Ms. Fraiberg claims, then her thesis has
grave implications for our society's future and the future of the
family. Ms. Fraiberg recognizes that not everyone can stay home
and care for their children in early infancy, either because of
1. See especially, A. Freud and D. Burlingham, Infants Without Families
(International Univ. Press, 1944); J. Bowlby, Maternal Care and Mental Health
(2nd ed: Geneva: World Health Organisation Monograph Series, No. 2, 1952). To
Bowlby compare the series of essays entitled Deprivation of Maternal Care: A
Reassessment of its Effects (Geneva: World Health Organisation, Public Health
Paper, No. 14, 1962)
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economic circumstances or pursuit of a career. If day care has to be
the answer, is quality day care available? Clearly it is not available
from the in-depth analysis made by the author. Nor is the situation
helped by the social assistance structure in the United States.
From this reviewer's experiences before the courts in child
welfare matters, there is much to be said for Ms. Fraiberg's
contentions. Lawyers who practice family law should read this
book. We must recognize that family problems are as much social
problems as they are legal questions. We will be better able to aid
our clients, the court and the children involved by having some
insight into child development.
This book raises fundamental questions relating to the duties of
parents. The implications of Ms. Fraiberg's thesis are obviously
far-reaching. If we are to care for our children in the way suggested,
there needs to be a re-thinking of the "parenting" role, the decision
to have children must be carefully evaluated by the would-be
parents and the governmental policies towards day care must
change. As one registrant said to this reviewer at the Halifax
Conference in June, 1978: "I was happy with the conclusions we
came to during International Women's Year, but after the
discussions today, I'm really confused."
Paul Thomas
Professor of Law
Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
